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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLARK EQUIP'MEN'T CREDIT 
COR:PORATION, a corpor:a;tion 
and CLARK EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY, a corpora:ti1on, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. Case No. 9637 
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 
CENTER, INC., 'and JOHN N. 
GALANIS and DENA 
GALANIS, 
Defendants and App.ellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF ·G~SE 
'This was an action filed in the 'Third District 
Court for Bait Lake County by the plaintiff corpor-
ations iagainst the appellants, Transport Equipment 
Center, Inc., John N. Galan'is rand Dena G'al:anis, 
and certain other defendants to re'cover upon a prom-
issory note executed in favor of the plaintiff, Clark 
Equipment Credit Corporation, by the appeUant, 
Transport Equipment Center. This note was exe-
cuted on or about November 23, 1959. The prayer 
of the plaintiffs' complaint was for a judgment in 
favor of Clark Equipment ·credit Corporation in the 
sum of $104, 629.37, which included unpaid interest, 
claimed to be due. 
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The action was also brought by Clark Equip-
ment Company to recover the sum of $3'5,300.2'5 for 
trailer and trailer parts allegedly supplied to Trans-
port Equipment Center, Inc., by the pFaintiff, Clark 
Equipment Company, on open account during a 
period when the appellant, ·Transport Equipment 
Center, was Clark Equipment Oomp:any dealer in 
Salt Lake City. 
The action against the individual defendants 
was base'd upon the execution by them of un-
conditional guarantees of the payment of the 
note which was executed by Transport Equipment 
Genter. In this connection the !appellants, John N. 
Gal,'anis ·and Dena Gal'ani.s, signed guarantees of pay-
ment of the Note in 'the amount of one hundred per 
cent '(1001o) of the amount of the note. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On December 7, 1'96'1, the plaintiff, Clark 
Equipment Credit Corporation, filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment ~against the defendants in con-
nection with their claim as it related to the Revolv-
ing Credit Agreement and the guarantees of the 
individua1 defendants. (R. 11516, 1157). 
Argumenlt on the Motion for Summary J udg-
ment was heard before the Honora:ble Merrill C. 
Faux, on Friday, Janu1ary 12, 19'6'2. Arguments of 
counsel were heard for the respective sides and at 
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the conclusion thereof the trial judge granted the 
Motion for Summary Judgment resulting in the 
filing of a Judgment against Transport Equipment 
Center, Inc., John N. G·alanis and DenJa Galanis in 
the sum of $110,9'27.36 which included the interest 
and the Judgment was ·to accrue interest at the rate 
of seven per cent (7%) per annum from the entry 
thereof. The entry of Judgment was February 16, 
19612 (R. '172, 173). 
RELIEF SOU'GHT ON APPEAL 
'The appellants seek reversal of the trial court's 
order which resulted in Summary Judgment 1against 
the parties appealing and for the referral by this 
Court to the trial court for a tria~ on the merits 
of the action. 
STATEMEN·T OF FACTS 
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., is :a Utah 
corporation, which at all times m1aterial to this 
action was engaged in the business of seUing, ser-
vicing, repairing and furnishing parts for trailers 
used in over-fue-road hauling. 
Transport Equipment Center, Inc., was a dealer 
for the Brown-T~ailer Division of Clark Equipment 
Company and operated as such pursuant to a ''Deal-
er Sales and Service Agreement" dated October 14, 
1958 (R. 117-1'29). 
_While operating as a dealer under the terms of 
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this agreement, Transport Equipment Center sold 
t~ailers, serviced and repaired them. Certain work 
on trailers of the Brown Division make was done 
by Transport Equipment Center pursuant to the 
warranty provision of the dealer contract (R. 121). 
This work was done at the request of the purchasers 
of trarlers claiming defective manufacture. This re-
sulted in a claim by Transport Equipment Center 
again'st Clark Equipment Company as an off-set 
to the open account claim by Clark Equipment Com-
pany against Transport Equipment Center (R. 85 
and 139). 
As 'a result of the fa:ilure or refusal of Clark 
Equipment Company to make satisfactory adjust-
ments of the accounts between it and Transpor1 
Equipment Center over a long period of time, 'Trans-
port Equipment Center became heavily indebted to 
Clark Equipment Company in 1an amount in excess 
of Transport Equipment cIa i m s against Clark 
Equipment Company ('R. 2 and 19). 
The indebtedness of ·Transport Equipment Cen-
ter to Clark Equipment Company was furtller in-
creased by reason of slow delivery of tra!lers 1and the 
delivery of them butlt to improper or wrong speci-
fications (R. 67). ·Thus, the unfavora;ble financial 
position of Transport Equipment Center was wor-
sened because of the refusal of Clark Equipment 
Company to negotiate differences and failure to pay 
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for warranty work. These failures required the use 
of operating capital of Transport Equipment Center 
to finance the items which Clark Equipment Com-
pany would not pay or negoti,ate ( R. 67). 
Finally, by re!ason of the course f)f dealings be-
tween the Clark Equipment Company and 'Trans-
port Equipment Center, the position of Transport 
Equipment Center required the execution of the 
"Revolving Credit Agree·ment " (R. 9'4-'104), the 
Promissory Note and the Agreements of Guaranty 
by the individual defendants. 
Clark Equipment Credit Corpor\ation and Clark 
Equipment Corporation instituted suit 1against the 
defendants when the Revolving Credit Agreement 
and the Promissory Note fell into default. The de-
fendants asserted defenses as set forth 'in their ·An-
swer and particu1ar ly the Amended Answer setting 
forth 'an affirm1a,tive Fourth 'Defense as fdllows: 
"As a further and affirmative defense, the an-
swering defendants allege as follows: 
'''1. That the conduct 'Of the plaintiff and 
of its officers has been such that the defen-
dants have been subjected to economi~ com-
pulsion and duress by the deliberate acts of 
the plaintiff. 
"2. That because of the e co n om i c 
threats, compul'sion and duress to which the 
defendants have been subjected as individuals 
and as officers of Transport Equipment Cen-
ter they have been required, as individuals 
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and officers, against their w}lls inquced an_d 
required to sign an executed revolving credit 
!agreement' referred to in plaintiffs' complai~t, 
and were further induced, coerced and requir-
ed by threats amounting to economic compul-
sion :and duress to ·sign guarantees of pay-
ment. 
"3. That the acts and conduct of the 
plaintiff which have subjected the defendants 
to coersion, compulsion and duress 1as herein 
alleged :are particularly set forth as follows: 
"(a) The plaintiff represented to the 
defendants that the revolving credit agree-
ment or refinancing plan into which the de-
fendants entered would be such as to permit 
short term borrowing from local filllancial in-
stitutions by Transport Equipment Center and 
in truth and in fact such short term borrow-
ing was specifically pohibited and that the 
plaintiff and its officers well knew that such 
short term borrowing was prohibited. 
"(b) That the slow delivery of trailers 
by the plaintiff 1and the delivery of trailers 
built to improper and wrong specifications 
brought Transport Equipment Center into 
such financial condition that it became neces-
sary to refinance the business and that by 
reason of this the defendants were forced, re-
quired and coerced into executing the 'revolv-
ing credit agreement' 1and the contracts of 
guarantee. 
" (c) The plaintif deliberately refused 
to negotiate claims which it had against 
Transport Equipment Center, the defendants, 
and ctaims which the defendants had against 
the plain tiff and further refused to pay the 
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defendant for warranty work done for the 
Brown Division of the plaintiff company. 
That said warranty work had to be paid for 
from operating capital of the defendant which 
worsened and deteriorated its financia'l con-
dition to the extent that the defendants were 
forced to enter into the 'revolving credit 
agreement' 'and the agreement of gua~antee. 
" (d) That the revolving credit agree-
ment and the agreements of guarantee were 
entered in to by reason of the threats of the 
plaintiff that the only altern1a:tive would be 
a management contract by which the plain-
tiffs would take over the business and the 
defendant, John Galanis, could be arbitrarily 
removed from the business 1after six ( 6) 
months at the sole and unilateral decision of 
the plaintiff. 
" (e) The plain tiff refused to permit 
the defendants to handle service and sell other 
makes of trarlers even though the plain tiff 
could not and would not supply the defendants 
with a complete line of trailer equipment. 
''(f) That the plaintiff deliberately de-
layed the negotiation of settlement of claims 
by the plaintif against the defendant and the 
defendants against the plain tiff and by reason 
of such delay there was a forced deterioration 
of the financial position of the defendant, 
Transport Equipment Center, which could 
not be avoided by the defendants bringing 
the defendants to the point where they were 
compelled to 1accede to the plaintiffs' require-
ments by executing the 'revolving credit agree-
ment' and the agreements of guarantee. 
''By reason of the threats, economic com-
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pulsion and duress practiced by the plaintiff 
upon the defendants, the execution of there-
volving credit agreement and the ~~reements 
of gua~an tee were not free and vohtional acts 
of the defendants or any of them, and any 
liability therefore of the defendants should 
be a voided and the plain tiffs take nothing by 
reason of said agreements 1against any of 
these answering defendants." (R 66-68). 
A summary Judgment was entered in favor 
of the plaintiffs January 16, 1962 (R. 172-173), 
without an opportunity to produce any testimony 
in support of this defense or other defenses asserted. 
'The individUJal defendants, John N. G·al'anis 
and Dena Galanis, his wife, are judgment creditors 
only because of the insistence of Clark Equipment 
Credit Company that these persons, and others, sign 
agreements guaranteeing the repayment of Trans-
port Equipment Company's note (R. 67-68). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIA'L COURT E R R E D IN GRANTING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR S'UMMARY JUDGMENT 
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
A. THE PLAINTIFF CORPORATIONS ARE REP-
RESENTED BY THE SAME PERSON AND THE AF-
FIRMATIVE DEFENSES ASSERTED ARE VALID AS 
AGAINST BOTH. 
B. THE DRASTIC DECISION OF SUMMARY 
J 1UDGMENT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE RECORD 
AND DEPRIVED DEFENDANTS OF THE RIGHT TO 
SUBMIT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THEIR DEFENSES. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIA·L COURT E R R E D IN GRANTING 
PLAINTI-FFS' MOTION FOR SUM'MARY JUDGMENT 
FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS: 
A. THE PLAIN'TIFF COR'PORATI'ONS ARE REP-
RESENTED BY THE SAME PERSON AND THE AF-
FIRMATIVE DEFENSES ASSERTED ARE VALID AS 
AGAINST BOTH. 
The Motion for Summary Judgment was ar-
gued to the trial judge January 1'2, 19·6'2. Extensive 
oral argument was m1ade by counse1 and the Court 
was referred to the pleadings and certain deposi-
tions were examined in the course of argument. 
Although there is no transcript of the oral 
colloquy 'between Court and counsel, i't appeared 
that the learned tr]al judge granted the Motion for 
Summary Judgment upon the theory that Cl'ark 
Equipment Company, !and Clark Equipment Credit 
Corporation were two distinct and separate entities. 
It further appeared tha't the Court felt 'that de-
fenses !asserted against Cl'ark Equipment Company 
were not properly asserta;ble against Cl'ark Equip-
ment Credit Co~poration. 
'This conclusion of the trial ·court would leave 
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation free and un-
touched by any of the defenses interposed against 
Clark Equipment Corpo~a,tion. 
No motion or other procedural device was ever 
m'ade or suggested by Clark Equipment Company 
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attacking the validity of the legal theory of the de-
fense of economic compulsion or duress. 
On Motion for Summary Judgment, extensive 
reference was made to the deposition of John Wood, 
an officer of both Clark Equipment Company and 
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation. For purposes 
of the argument the deposition of John Wood was 
published. Nothing coUld so graphically demonstrate 
the complete identity of the two corporations or the 
fact that an officer of both corporations represented 
them in a:l1 dealings with Transport Equ'ipment than 
the deposition of Mr. John R. Wood. In support of 
this contention, the testimony of Mr. Wood on depo-
sition is set forth 'as follows : 
"Q What is your occupation, Mr. 
Wood? 
"A Vice President and Treasurer of 
Clark Equipment Company. President of 
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation. 
"Q How long have you been president 
of Clark Equipment Credit Corporation? 
"A During 1961. Prior to that time I 
was Vice President ·and Treasurer. 
"Q For what length of time were you 
Vice Pres'ident and Treasurer of Clark Equip-
ment Credit Corporation? 
"A Since its inception in June of 19'54. 
"Q Is Clark Equipment Credit Corpor-
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"Q. Is Clark Equipment Company a 
Michigan corporation? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Is Clark Equipment Credit Corpor-
ation a wholly owned subsidiary of Clark 
Equipment Company? 
'''A Yes. 
"Q Are you a Director of Clark Equip-
ment Credit Corporation? 
'I'A Yes. 
"Q For what length of time have you 
been 1a Director of that corporation? 
"'A Since its inception. 
''Q Who are the other Directors of 
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation? 
"A All directors are also officers of 
Clark Equipment Company. Do you want their 
names? 
''Q Are alt Directors of Clark Equip-
ment Credit Corporation 1a1so Directors of 
Clark Equipment Company? 
"A No. 
"Q We had better have their names, 
then. Tell me the names of the Directors of 
Clark Equipment Credit Corporation? 
'''A George Spatta, Walter Shirmer, My-
self, Clarence K'illebrew, Burt Phillips, J. F. 
Bechtel. 
"Q There are six Directors? 
"A Yes sir. 
''Q Could you give me the names of the 
Directors of Clark Equipment Company? 
11 
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''A There are twenty of them. They are 
all published. 
'''Q Let me get at it this wa:y" Is George 
Spatta a Director of Clark Equipment Com-
pMy? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Is Mr. Shirmer a Director of Clark 
Equipment Company? 
"Q Of course you were a Director of 
Clark Equipment Company? 
'''A Yes. 
'''Q And Mr. Killebrew is ~a Director of 
Clark Equipment Company? 
''A Yes. 
"Q Of the six directors of Clark Equip-
ment Credit Corporation, four, or a majority 
of the Board, are also Directors of Clark 
Equipment Company? 
'''A Yes sir. 
'''Q Has that been the situation since 
C1ark Equipment Credit Corpom.tion was or-
ganized? 
"A No sir. 
''Q Has Clark Equipment Company had 
control of the Board of Directors of Clark 
Equipment Credit Corporation since organ-
ization? 
''A Since Clark Equipment Company 
owns 100 per cent of the outstanding stock 
of Clark Equipll_len t Credit Oorpol'lation in non 
legal language 1t must control the Directors. 
"Q The Board as well as -
''A Who votes for the Board of Direc-
12 
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tors except the stockholders, and if the stock-
holders vote for the Board of Directors -
"Q I don't want to argue with you. 
"A You use words I can't answer. You 
said 'control'. 
"MR. ROE : Will you tell me what 
you mean by 'control'? 
''Q Have at least f:our of the Directors 
of Clark Equipment Credit Corporation since 
the organization of that company also been 
Directors of Clark Equipment Company? 
"A No. 
"Q Who were the original Directors of 
Clark Equipment Credit Corpo~ation? 
"A These same men, excepting that 
Davies was substituted for Phillips, and that 
is the only difference. 
''Q What is Davies full name? 
"A Robert H. Davies. He was a Vice 
President of Clark Equipment Company, but 
not 1a director. 
''Q All right, That clears it up, I think. 
'''Are the executive offices of Clark Equipment 
Credit Corporation in the same building as 
the executive offices of Clark Equipment Com-
pany? 
"A Yes. 
''Q Is there any physical division of the 
facilities of the Equipment Company as con-
trasted with the Credit Gorpo~a:tion? 
''A Yes. 
"Q Do the personnel of the Equipment 
Company occupy different space? 
13 
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"A Yes. 
"Q Are legal counsel the same for the 
two companies? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Are the accountants the same for 
the two companies? 
'''A Yes. 
I am going to correct the statement 
on the legal counsel. The answer is 'No' -
outside legal counsel. 
"Q Is the house counsel the same for the 
two companies? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Who is that? 
"A Whoever is in the employ of the 
company at the time. 
''Q Who is it now? 
''A Who is it now? 
"Q Who is it now? 
"A David L. Howel'l. 
"Q Only Mr. Howell? 
''A And assistants. 
''Q Does he have an assistant? 
"A Many assistants. 
"Q Mr. Howell and his staff perform 
house counsel services for both the Clark 
Equipment Company and the Clark Equip-
ment Credit Corporation? 
'''A Yes sir. 
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"A Since the inception of-the company. 
That applies to the man who is in the position 
of house counsel, not to Mr. Howell. 
"Q Are you a stockholder of Cla:rk 
Equipment Company, Mr. Wood? 
"A Yes sir. 
''Q Have you been a stockholder at all 
times materi!a;l 'to this lawsuit? 
"A Yes. 
* * * 
"Q Has there been some single person 
in Transport Equipment Company and Trans-
port Equipment Credit Corporation who h:as 
heen in charge of this T.E.C. situation, Mr. 
Wood? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Who is that person? 
"'A John Galanis. 
'''Q I am speaking of representative or 
person representing Cla:rk Equipment Com-
pany-
"A Oh. 
'"Q - and Clark Equipment Credit 
Corporation. Has there been some person that 
the two companies have designated as the per-
son in charge of this situation? 
''A I am responsible ror all of the credit 
activities of Clark Equipment Company, and 
have been all during the time of the relation-
ship of Clark Equipment Company and Clark 
Credit Corporation with T.E.C. 
''Q It would be correct, then-
" A I want to finish my 'Statement. 
15 
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''Q Excuse me. 
"A - and from the period of the 'in-
ception of the relationship with T.E.C., w~ich 
was the date of 'acquisition of Brown Tra1ler 
Company by Clark Equipment Com~any, I 
participated with others in the relationship 
with T.E.C. on other than financial matters. 
"And in the period from May 25, ap-
proximrately, 1959, until September 25, 1960, 
approximately, I was fully responsible for the 
relationship on all matters with T.E.C. as 
far as the sales activity, and other relation-
ships were concerned.'' 
Since a corpor.ation exists as a legal entity by 
statutory fiat, it can act only through its officers 
and agents. Therefore, knowledge of officers and 
agents who are acting within the scope of the auth-
ority .conferred upon them by the corporation is im-
puted to the corporation. Knox vs. First Security 
Bank of Utah, 206 F. 2d 823 (lOth Cir., Utah) ; 
Bergeson vs. Life Insurance Corporation of Amer-
ica, '265 F. 2d '227 (10th Cir., Utah) ; Mary Jane 
Stevens Company vs. First National Building Com-
pany, '89 ·utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099. 
'This prin~ip'le also finds 'application in those 
situations where two corporations have a common 
officer or agent as in the instant case. 
3 Fletcher's Cyclopedia Corporations, Section 
790, Pages 20-26: 
". . . the gene:rlal rule is well established 
that a corporation is charged with construc-
16 
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tive knowledge, regardless of its actual knowl-
edge, of any material f!aets of which its offi-
cer or agents receives notice or 1aequires 
knowledge while acting in the course of his 
employment within the scope of h'is authority, 
even though the officer or agent does not in 
fact communicate his know ledge 'to the corp-
oration (citing numerous case's.)" 
* * * 
'''Where the officers and agents of two 
corporations are identical, each one is charge-
able with notice of everything that ~omes to 
the knowledge of the common officers." 
In further elaboration of this principle the fol-
lowing is stated from the 'same source at pages 
131-132: 
"The rule that if one is agent of both 
parties to a transaction and tHis is known and 
consented to, noUce to him is noti1ce to both 
~df them if it swould be notice if the agent 
represented such one alone, is applied to agents 
of corporations ... Where two corporations 
have interlocking and common management, 
and one of them procures the property of a 
third party by fraud, the other ~orporation 
is charged with the notice, and if it takes the 
property or its proceeds, it is chargeable with 
the value thereof." (Citing cases) 
In the present case, the defendant set up de-
fenses against Clark Equipment Credit Comrp!any, 
as outlined above, whi1ch defenses arose by reason 
of its dealings with Mr. Wood, who was a common 
officer in the Clark Equipment Credit Company land 
17 
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Clark Equipment Company. He was authorized by 
both companies to handle all transactions with de-
fendants, T~ansport Equipment Center and Galanis. 
Thus, Mr. Wood's dealings with the Transport 
Equipment Center on behalf of the Clark Equipment 
Company and the Clark Equipment Credit Corpora-
tion were inter-related and in fact consumm1ated in 
the same series of negotiations. Mr. Wood was speci-
fically authorized to supervise all matters of credit 
in wh'ich defendants were involved with Clark Equip-
ment Company and the Clark Equipment Credit 
Company. The Clark Equipment Credit Corpora-
tion is a wholly owned subsidiary of Olark Equip-
ment Company. Four of the six directors of the 
Credit Company are also on the Board of Directors 
of the Equrpment Company. 
'The concept of charging two corporations with 
knowledge received by a common officer has received 
the endorsement of this Court in the case of Utah 
Bond and Share Company vs. Chappel, et al., 68 
Utah 5'30, 5·36, 2'51 P. 354: 
~'!Two corporations may be so closely af-
filiated in business that one is a mere agent 
or instrumentality of the other. In such case, 
the law of agency would apply and the knowl-
edge of the ·agent, within the scope of its auth-
ority, would be binding upon its principal." 
It seems obvious that any knowledge which Mr. 
Wood acquired as an officer and agent of Clark 
Equipment Company is chargeable to the Clark 
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Equipment Credit Company for purposes of this 
suit. In fact, Mr. Wood, as agent and officer of 
Clark Equipment Company, di~ctated the terms upon 
which settlement of the differences between thJat 
company and Transport Equipment Center would 
be effected. It was upon his insistence that a Promis-
sory Note to Clark Equipment Credit Corporation, 
rather than the Equipment Company, was issued by 
defendants. The note given represented the agreed 
indebtedness as of that date to the Equipment Com-
,pany. Any dealings by defendants wi'th the Clark 
Equipment Credit Corporation were for the con-
venience of the Equipment Company and to assist 
Mr. Wood. Therefore, any notice or kn'Owledge with 
reference to defenses available to Transport Equip-
ment Center against Clark 'Equipment Company are 
similarly avai1·able against the Credit Corporation 
because of the dual capacity in wHich Mr. Wood 
acted at the time the Promissory Note in que'Stion 
here was negoti!ated. Because identical knoWledge 
is chargeable to Clark Equipment Credit Corpora-
tion as was in possession of the Equipment Com-
pany, through their common officer and agent, 'Mr. 
Wood, the Credit Corporation claim is subject 
to all of the defenses whi1ch were available 
against the Clark Equipment Company. It is con-
trary to conscience and equity under the facts of 
this case to permit Clark Equipment Credit Corpor-
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ation to draw a shroud about itself and remain im-
mune from legal defenses which the defendants have 
against its parent company. 
B. THE DRASTIC DECISION OF SUMMARY 
J1UDGMENT W ~S NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE RECORD 
AND DEPRIVED DEFENDANTS OF THE RIGHT TO 
SUBMIT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THEIR DEFENSES. 
For purposes of considering the Motion for 
Summary Judgment the allegations respecting the 
use of coercion and duress 'by the defendant, Cl1ark 
Equipment Company, must be considered as true. 
As this court observed in Brandt vs. Springville 
Banking Company, 10 Utah 2d 3'50, 3'53 P. 2d 460, 
"We are obEged to review the record in 
the light most favorable to the party against 
whom the motion w.as granted." 
As was pdinted out in the argument in sup-
port of sub-point A, these acts are chargeable 
against Clark Equipment Credit Corporation as well 
as Clark Equipment Company. 
1This being the case, certainly there existed a 
genuine and material issue of fact to be decided. 
That the pleadings presented such a material ques-
tion of fact was not at any time even questioned by 
the plaintiff, Clark Equipment Company. 
It is axiomatic that the remedy of summary 
judgment 'is a stringent and drastic one which the 
courts will grant reluctantly and with extreme care. 
An excellent statement by this court of that 
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doctrine is found in Bullock vs. Deser.et Dodge Truck 
Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 'P. '2d ·5'5'9. 
Respecting the summary judgment p~oposition, 
Mr. J ustiee Wiade U'sed this language : 
"A summary judgment must be support-
ed by evidence, adm'issions and inference 
when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the loser shows that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to 1a judgment as a matter 
of 'law. Sueh showing must include a1l reason-
able possibility that the loser could, if given 
a trial, produce evidenee which would reason-
rubly sustain a judgment 'in hi's favor." 
We urgently submit that under the facts alleged 
in the pleadings 'in this ·case t:hJat 1issue'S were framed 
in the interests of justice require'd a trial :with re-
spect to them. 
·A ca·se similar to the one at bar in many re-
spects 'is Holzman vs. Bar~ett, a case decided by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, reported at 192 
F. 2d 113. 
'This case was an !a;ction by the plaintiff for 
money damages based upon a claim that the several 
defendants, including the Attorney General of Il-
linoi's, had conspired to make the plaintiff transfer 
to two of the plaintiffs his control of the stock in 
an insurance company. 
The complaint al'leged that the Attorney Gen-
eral had threatened to appoint a rehabilitator for 
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the insurance company if the p~aintiff refused to 
accede to the .dema:dds of defendants. 
The trial court gran ted a 'Motion for Summary 
Judgment in favor of the defendants and against 
plaintiff, !and this decision was rever·sed by the 
Seventh Circuit Court. 
Certain affidavits were submitted by both par-
~ies, by the defendants in support of their Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and by the plaintiff in sup-
port of what was des·cribed as a Motion to Strike 
the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
'These raffidavits related to the ·contentions of the 
parties respecting whether the duress and coercion 
claimed did, in fact, exi'st. The court in its discus-
sion quoted a portion of the opinion of Guardwn 
Trust Company vs. M.eyer, 19 F. 2d 186, as follows: 
-"Whether such duress exists as to a par-
ticular transaction is !a matter of fact. There 
the suit was upon notes given by the defendant 
in lieu of other notes which had been obtained 
from him by duress. One of the isisues in the 
case was whether the defendant by the execu-
tion of the renewal note's had ratified the 
original. The court in discussing this question 
stated at 19 F. 2d 1'93, 'the same fear of 
prosecution that compefled the execution of 
the note's continued as a matter of course; 
the defendant in error so testified, and reason 
supports his testimony. All his subsequent 
statements are readily attributable to this 
mental state.' " 
'The f!act situation in that case appears very 
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similar to the ones set forth by the allegations of 
the defendants in this case. 
In the Seventh Circuit opinion in the Rolzroon 
vs. Barrett case, concludes with this language : 
"In view of what we have sa:id, we think 
that there was a genuine issue !as to a ma-
terial fact, that 'is, whether the plaintiff, at 
the time of the execution of the 1'949 agree-
ments was acting under duress imposed by 
the defendants, and that the defendants Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment Wlas erroneous'ly 
allowe'd. The legal issues argued here as to 
the interpretation and effect to be given the 
'1948 agreements rest upon the premise that 
there was no issue of duress raised re~ative 
to their execution. The pertinency of these 
issues of law is, therefore, dependent upon a 
decision of the factual 1issue favorable to the 
defendants." 
Certainly a proper and just resolution of the 
problem posed by the instant case required a deter-
mination of the factual issues raised by the defenses 
and by the re'ception of evidence respecting them. 
The trial court's action, therefore, in gr1anting the 
Motion for Summary Judgment improperly denied 
the defendants the right to have the validity of their 
defenses tried out. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respeetfully submitted that the 
tria'l court's Summary Judgment 'Should be reversed 
and the matter 'sent back to the tria1 court for a 
hearing and trial upon the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR. and 
MERLIN R. LYBBERT 
Attorneys for Appellants 
515 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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